I examine the e ects of the introduction of the Spouse's Allowance to the Canadian Income Security system on the retirement behavior of couples. This policy intervention provides an excellent opportunity to investigate how income security programs a ect the timing of retirement. The structure of the Allowance also provides a view of how programs targeted at one spouse can a ect the behavior of the other. Finally, conditional of the types of data available for this time period, the analysis considers the joint labor market decisions of couples. The results indicate that the introduction of the Allowance is associated with decreased employment rates and increased not in the labor force rates among eligible males. Eligible females did not share the rising employment rates over the 1970s experienced by their counterparts who were not eligible for the Spouse's Allowance.
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the aging populations of developed countries present one of the greater public policy challenges of the next century. Government transfers to the aged are typically one of the fastest growing components of government expenditure and many public pension plans are in poor scal health. In response, resources have been channeled into research programs on aging and retirement behavior. There is growing recognition, however, that the greater part of this research may miss part of the story. Traditionally, the focus has been on males modeled as independent decision makers. Yet the upward trend in the labor market participation of females implies that they will beboth part of the retirement problem", as well as any solution.
The issue, therefore, is that the retirement behavior of both males and females is of interest, but there is just a handful of studies on this topic. 1 The scarcity of appropriate data, the complexity of the family decision making process and the historically low labor market activity of women have meant that many of the basic characteristics of couples' retirement behavior|the incidence of joint retirement, the in uence of one spouse's economic opportunities on the retirement decision of the other spouse|are unknown or have just recently been explored. If the retirement decisions of couples are strongly connected, the reasons must bean important input to any reform of social security programs. Alternatively, many social security programs would appear to tie the retirement decisions of couples. Understanding the e ects of any incentives for joint decision making is critical to forecasting the future scal balance of these programs in a labor market of dual worker families. 2 Canada has a numberof social security programs for seniors that would appear to induce interdependence in labor market behavior. 3 In this paper, I examine the introduction, in the 1970s, of one of them: the Spouse's Allowance SPA, a program nominally designed to aid couples attempting to live on one pension. Because females tend to marry older males, and males have historically been the primary earners, many Canadian couples of limited resources found themselves in precarious circumstances at retirement. The Canadian Income Security IS system of the 1970s included two age-related bene ts and an earnings related public pension, all available starting at age 65. Assuming joint retirement, many couples would retire when the male turned 65 with only his IS bene ts as support. The Spouse's Allowance made the age related bene ts of the system available to individuals typically the female at age 60 if they were married to someone who was 65 or older.
I examine how the introduction of this program in 1975 a ected the labor market decisions of the eligible couples. The empirical strategy is to compare separately changes in retirement behavior of males 65-75 and females 60-64 who became eligible for the Spouse's Allowance to that of their counterparts of the same age, who due to the age of their spouse did not qualify for an Allowance. I also provide some evidence on joint labor market status, although a direct analysis of joint retirement is prohibited by the lack of panel data for this period. One of the attractive features of this episode is the opportunity to analyze couples' behavior using a policy intervention rather than cross individual variation in bene t entitlement, which is likely correlated with unobserved determinants of labor market decisions.
It is acknowledged at that outset, that older females in the 1970s did not have high labor market participation rates, and so the potential for any e ect on their behavior is in some sense bounded. Nevertheless, this is a period of rising female labormarket activity, so that that the e ect of the program may h a ve been to remove 3 Gruber 1997 provides a simulation analysis of the tax incentives of various Canadian income security programs, highlighting the e ects of means tested programs which are based on family income. women eligible for the Allowance from this trend.
The results indicate that the introduction of the program is associated with a decrease in employment rates and increase in not in the labor force NLF rates among eligible males. The preferred estimates indicate that the NLF rates of eligible males rose 6 to 7 percentage points relative to males in the control groups. They provide further evidence of how government social security programs can in uence the retirement behavior of individuals, and how in this instance males responded to a program which was targeted in e ect at their spouses. I also observe relative reductions in labor market activity among eligible females. SPA eligible females did not share the rising employment rates of their counterparts in the control groups. Instead, their behavior bears a strong resemblance to that of females aged 65-75 married to males 65-75. The common factor here is that these older women had access to the age related bene ts of the IS system throughout the sample period. The introduction of the SPA put these two groups on even footing. I also provide some evidence that the response is concentrated among individuals who are predicted to beon the part of the budget constraint where the SPA should have its greatest effect, or more generally who have limited labor market opportunities. Finally, the results indicate that the introduction of the program is correlated with a increase in joint absence from the labor market among eligible couples.
The Canadian Income Security Programs
Canada's social security system, circa the 1970's, had the same three main components present today: the Old Age Security OAS pension established in 1952, 4 the Guaranteed Income Supplement GIS established in 1967 and the Canada Pension Plan CPP; Quebec Pension Plan QPP for workers in Quebec established in 1966. The OAS at this time was an unconditional cash bene t paid to individuals who satis ed age and residency requirements. 5 Starting in 1970, all individuals 65 years of age or older were eligible for this bene t. The GIS was and still is a means tested supplement for OAS pensioners. Bene ts were not subject to regular income tax, and there were di erent bene t rates for single and married persons. Finally, the retirement portion of the CPP and QPP pensions was, with some exceptions, similar to its present manifestation. Bene ts were calculated on the basis of an individual's earnings history starting at age 18, and available starting at age 65 presently bene ts can beclaimed as early as age 60. 6 The bene ts payable under these three programs over the 1970's are graphed in gure 1. 7 Both OAS and CPP QPP bene ts were paid out at the individual level, and the programs' regulations did not directly tie the retirement decisions of spouses. 8 There has always been a direct interdependence, however, in the GIS program. The amount of GIS bene ts is based on family income excluding OAS and GIS bene ts and a few other exemptions. For married individuals, how bene ts are taxed back under the means test depends on whether both are pensioners. The rules in the 1970's were: 1 if both members of a couple were pensioners 65 or older, the benets of each were taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for each dollar of monthly family income in excess of the family's combined OAS bene ts for a combined tax rate of 50 percent at the family level, and 2 if only one memberof the couple was a pensioner, the monthly bene t was taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for each dollar of monthly family income in excess of the OAS pension, and the initial reduction did 5 There is now a clawback of bene ts from high income individuals. 6 Further details of these programs can be found in Baker and Benjamin 1998 and 1999 , Burbidge 1987 CCH Canadian Limited 1996 , Gruber 1997 and Pesando and Rea 1977 As a point of reference, as of January 1999 the monthly OAS pension is $410.82, the maximum CPP pension for retirement at age 65 is $751.67 and the maximum GIS bene ts for single and married individuals are $488. 23 and $318.01, respectively. 8 In fact, there is some interdependence between an individual and a deceased spouse through the survivor's bene t. The details can be found in Gruber 1997. not occur until annual family income exceeded roughly 12 times the monthly OAS bene t. 9 It is important to account for changes in these programs over the period the SPA was introduced, as any reforms could complicate inference. The main changes in the public pension programs were the elimination of the earnings test for beneciaries 65-69 from the CPP in 1975 and the QPP in 1977, and the end of the socalled transition period" of both programs in 1976. Baker and Benjamin 1999 argue that the removal of the earnings test led to a signi cant increase in weeks worked conditional on employment among males 65-69. Although not formally analyzed, the results from that study also suggest that the end of the transition period 1966-1975 was correlated with an increase in pension receipt for males, 65 and older. 10 Over this period, individuals received only part of the full pension" they quali ed for, to account for the fact they had contributed to the plan for a short time. The pro-rating fraction rose linearly over the 10 year period, so that in January 1976 individuals could draw the full pension they quali ed for subject to the other rules of the plan. 11 One could imagine that some workers may have delayed retirement until January 1976 so as to be able to draw a full pension. However, simulations of the present value of pension bene ts at di erent retirement ages reveal that in the early 1970s the annual increase in the pro-rating fraction was roughly equivalent to an actuarially fair adjustment in pension bene ts for delaying retirement. 12 That said, in the 1970s the CPP and QPP provided no explicit actuarial adjustment to bene ts for delaying retirement beyond age 65, so with the end of the 9 Also, in this case an individual was eligible for the larger single person bene t. 10 An increase in pension receipt need not imply a reduction in labor supply in the absence of the earnings test. Unfortunately, it is di cult to isolate the labor market e ects of the end of the transition period since they are perfectly co-linear with a 1976 year e ect.
11 Further detail is provided in Benjamin 1999 and CCH Canadian Limited 1996. 12 These simulations are calculated for an individual turning 65 in 1972 and are available from the author on request. transition period many individuals would have had a strong incentive to initiate pension receipt at that age. 13 For the OAS, the major reforms were the full indexation of bene ts starting 1972, and a modi cation of the residency requirement in 1977. Finally, the GIS was fully indexed in 1973.
The Spouse's Allowance
The Spouse's Allowance SPA came into e ect October 1, 1975 to supplement the limited resources of couples living on the pension income of only one spouse, and more recently 1985 to enhance the circumstances of elderly widows and widowers. The program can betraced to a campaign promise of the Progressive Conservative party in the federal election of the early summer, 1974. 14 The Liberal party consequently embraced a largely identical proposal, and upon winning the election incorporated it into their Throne Speech of September30, 1974. The Speech was quite speci c about the proposal and in particular mentions October 1, 1975 as a target date for implementation. The necessary amendments to the Old Age Security Act were passed in June 1975, and the program began operations on the target date.
The original program provided bene ts to individuals between the ages of 60 and 64, who were spouses of OAS pensioners. Like the GIS, bene ts were means tested on the basis of family income, and not subject to regular income taxes. The maximum payment was equal to the sum of the OAS pension and the GIS benet at the married rate. Therefore, the SPA potentially made a couple as well o as they would beif both members were 65 years of age or older; in e ect the program allowed qualifying spouses to receive their OAS and GIS bene ts up to ve 13 The exception is for individuals whose further contributions to the plans would improve their earnings histories.
14 The original proposal envisioned a program covering spouses aged 55-65. years earlier than other members of the population. The equivalency is not exact, however, since SPA bene ts were taxed back at higher rates than GIS bene ts for marginal family income. The e ective tax on bene ts was 75 percent for each dollar of monthly family income in excess of OAS and GIS bene ts. This rate was in e ect until an amount of the Allowance equivalent to an OAS pension was recovered when family income equaled 4 3's of the OAS bene t. At this point, both the Spouse's Allowance and the pensioner's the spouse 65 or older GIS bene t were taxed back at a rate of 25 percent for additional family income. Therefore, at the family level, bene ts were subject to e ective tax rates in excess of 75 percent. 15 The program was revised in November1978 and November1979 to address the hardship faced by bene ciaries whose spouse died. 16 Initially, if the pensioner spouse of an individual who was collecting an Allowance died, the SPA was terminated. 17 The nancial circumstances of the widow or widower were further impaired by the fact that the deceased spouse's OAS and GIS bene ts would also be lost. The widow widower would eventually qualify for their own OAS and GIS bene ts, but this could bemore than 4 years in the future. The program rules were changed so that the SPA would continue to bepaid to a widow widower for at rst 6 months after the death of the pensioner 1978, and subsequently until the individual reached age 65 and would qualify for his her own OAS and GIS 1979. 18 The program was subsequently revised again in 1985 to provide bene ts to all low income widows or widowers, between the ages of 60 and 64, regardless of when their spouse died. This reform falls outside the sample period and will not beexam- 15 Family income for the purposes of the means test was calculated for the calendar year preceding the scal year April-March of application. In the year of retirement, however, couples were permitted to substitute an estimate of income for the current calendar year re ecting their new presumably reduced circumstances. 16 The plight of widows and widowers was the main objections raised by opposition parties to the original SPA legislation. 17 The SPA also ended if the couple became separated or divorced. 18 Under the new rules the SPA w ould end if the individual re-married.
ined here.
The Predicted E ects of the Introduction of the Spouse's Allowance
The e ects of the introduction of the SPA o n the choice of family labor supply in a given year can beexamined using the family budget constraint within the context of a simple Becker Mincer model of the division of labor within the household. Before the introduction of the Allowance the components of family income are assumed to bethe pensioner's OAS and GIS and any labor market earnings of the couple. For simplicity the amounts of any CPP pension or other non labor income are assumed to be zero. 19 In gure 2, I graph family income against weeks of leisure" in a given year. The distance AB is the amount of the pensioner's OAS pension $1551 in 1975. ABCD is the family budget constraint in the absence of the GIS or the SPA. It is drawn assuming the husband has comparative advantage at market work, and that this advantage is manifest in the relative wage rates. 20 The slope of BC, therefore, is w M the male's wage, while the slope of CD is the female's wage, w F .
The distance BE is the amount of the pensioner's GIS pension when the only other income is an OAS pension $1088 in 1975. The reduction in the GIS with labor market earnings is drawn for a pensioner whose spouse did not qualify for a pension. This would bethe most common case for couples who would subsequently qualify for the SPA. An initial amount of income roughly equal to the annual OAS pension is exempt for the purposes of the GIS means test. Therefore, the segment 19 Any amounts of these sorts of income would have the e ect of lowering the amount of the GIS pension when labor market earnings equal zero and thus also lowering the break even" level. 20 The assumption that the male has comparative advantage in market work is adopted for its consistency with the traditional sexual division of market and non-market time common among older couples of this time. The assumption that the comparative advantage is manifest in wage rates is to retain a simple presentation within a standard labor supply diagram. A su cient condition for this to be true is equal absolute advantage in non market work. Alternatively, the analysis could be conducted in a model of the allocation between market and non market goods without this simpli cation.
EF has the slope w M . At point F, the marginal dollar of labor market earnings leads to a 25 cent reduction in the GIS, and therefore the slope of FG is 0:75w M . The GIS is completely taxed away at point G, which in 1975 was around $5903.
The introduction of the SPA shifts the budget constraint to AHIJCD. The distance EH is the amount of the SPA when labor market earnings equal zero. 21 The SPA is taxed back at a rate of 75 percent for any earnings until an amount equivalent to the OAS is recovered. Therefore, the segment HI has the slope 0:25w M . Any additional dollar of family earnings leads to a 50 cent reduction in non OAS government support the pensioner's GIS and the GIS equivalent portion of the SPA which in 1975 totaled $1933. 22 At point J all government assistance other than the pensioner's OAS is recovered which in 1975 occurred at labor market earnings of about $5934.
The shift in the budget constraint with the introduction of the SPA has an unambiguous negative e ect on labor supply. Over the segment HIJ both a substitution e ect and an income e ect act to reduce weeks of work, assuming leisure is a normal good. Also, families initially locating near the break even point may have found it optimal to reduce labor supply to qualify for some government support. Only families who were initially a su cient distance above point J, or had enough other non labor income to make the GIS and SPA irrelevant would beuna ected by the reform. 23 In the diagram as drawn, any e ect of the SPA would bevisible in the male's labor supply, since if both members of the couple were working they would belo-cated well above the break even point. For low wage families, however, the break even point might bebeyond the kink at point C, and therefore both male and female labor supply would bea ected. Note that in dual worker families, the model as drawn rules out any reductions of male labor supply without concurrent reductions in the female's work. 24 
Data and Empirical Strategy
Most of the analysis is based on the census family les of the Survey of Consumer Finances, from 1972 , 1974 , 1976 , 1978 and 1980 . These are retrospective surveys conducted in April of the indicated years. Relative to individual level les, these data exclude unmarried individuals living at home, who are of limited concern here given the focus on the elderly. The data for Quebec are excluded from the analysis sample. As noted above, the earnings test was removed from the CPP and QPP at di erent times in the period of analysis. It is convenient to treat this reform as a common time e ect, and this is most easily accomplished if the data for Quebec are excluded.
The introduction of the Spouse's Allowance should have its primary e ects on 1 individuals over the age of 64 who have spouses between the ages of 60 and 64, and 2 these same spouses. Given the common practice of females marrying older males, it seems reasonable to focus the analysis on males 65-75 and females between the ages of 60-64, whose spouses' characteristics satisfy the requirements of the SPA program. 25 In each case the strategy is to compare measures of the labor market attachment of these groups before and after the introduction of the Allowance.
This time series variation, however, is not su cient. Clearly, there is the pos-sibility of falsely attributing the labor market impacts of unobserved time e ects which are concurrent with the introduction of the Allowance, to the SPA. More generally, secular trends in the labor market behavior of these groups might also end up a SPA e ect. Finally, any e ects of reforms of the CPP around the time of the introduction of the SPA must beaccommodated.
To account for these possibilities, I use the labor market behavior of individuals of similar age, but whose marital circumstances render them ineligible for the SPA as control groups. For the analysis of males I consider three control groups: 1 males 65-75 with spouses aged 65-75, 2 males 65-75 with spouses aged 50-59 and 3 males 65-75 who are single. In each case these men are not eligible for the SPA. In the analysis of females the control groups are females aged 60-64 with spouses aged 1 50-59 years and 2 60-64 years old. In this case it is not possible to use single females, 60-64, as a control group. As noted above some of these individuals became eligible for the SPA i n 1978 and 1979 under the new provisions for widowers.
The standard objections to this experimental" strategy are that individuals in the di erent control groups might di er from their counterparts who are SPA eligible in both observed and unobserved ways, there may b e group-speci c trends in labor market behavior, or there may beunobserved year e ects, coincident with the introduction of the SPA, that have heterogeneous impacts across groups. Any observable di erences across the groups are controlled for directly in the estimation to extent that they are captured by characteristics available in the SCF's, while average unobserved di erences are captured by xed e ects. An investigation of any di erences in trend labor market behavior can beconducted with data from the period prior to the introduction of the SPA. A validation of the assumption of homogeneous year e ects is more di cult. In the absence of random assignment, it is important to directly consider the suitability of the di erent control groups. Further justi cation and criticism of the choices made here is provided in the course of the analysis.
Some selected mean characteristics of the various groups are reported in table 1. For males, the most striking di erences are in average age and the presence of children who are enrolled full time in school. SPA eligible males are a full two years younger than males whose spouses are 65-75, but marginally older than their counterparts whose wives are 50-59. Also, this latter group of males is far more likely to have children at home enrolled full time in school. Among the di erent groups of females the largest di erences are in educational attainment and urban residence. Those with spouses aged 50-59 are more likely to have more then a primary education and live in an urban area.
Other objections to the empirical strategy are the possibilities that individuals anticipated the policy change, or the program was introduced in response to some trend in the labor market behavior of the target group. As noted above, the program gained public exposure in the federal election of 1974. 26 It is probably safe to assume that the Canadian public took the campaign promises of the various parties with a grain of salt. The program appeared on rmer ground in the Throne Speech of September1974, although it is not unusual for governments to fail to implement their entire legislative agenda before their term ends. The data I use to measure labor market attachment before the introduction of the SPA are from April 1972 and 1974. These dates precede the dissolution of parliament on May 9, 1974 and the subsequent election campaign in which the SPA entered public debate. Also the social policy document that became the basis of the Progressive Conservatives' proposal for a spouse's allowance was released in May 1974. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that these data predate any wide public reliance on the promise of the SPA.
The motivation for the SPA, as revealed by parliamentary debate and subse-quent Standing Committee discussion, was the hardship experienced by couples attempting to live on one pension. 27 Opposition criticism of the legislation centered on other needy groups among the elderly, and the fact that the program discriminated against poor individuals who were not married. The labor market status of the target population, however, was not absent from the discussions. In fact, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Marc Lalonde, predicted little labor market response to the new program, stating, The SPA eligible spouse is, in most cases, not a memberof the work force and highly unlikely to beemployed in any case" House of Commons Debates, June 6, 1975. To measure the e ect of the introduction of the SPA on labor market behavior, I estimate the equation using samples of SPA eligible males or females and the various control groups from the 1972 the , 1974 the , 1978 the and 1980 Note that data from the 1976 SCF are initially not used because the survey week April 1976 is not long after the introduction of the program October 1975. y it is a measure of labor market behavior in the survey reference week. The X it are a set of individual level demographic variables, SPA it is a dummy variable which equals one if an individual is eligible for the SPA, Y 72 it and Y 80 it are year dummies that equal one in the indicated years, and Y 78 it = 1 in years 1978 and later the SCF years that the Spouse's Allowance was available. Therefore, b provides the an estimate of the di erence in the change in the dependent variable, y it , between individuals who were eligible for the SPA and those in the control group, as the new program was introduced. The measures of labormarket attachment examined y it are employment and not in the labor force rates in the reference week.
Two speci cations of 1 are estimated. In the rst, the X it consist of a full set of province e ects the base speci cation. In the second, I add dummy variables for single year age categories, education, urban residence, and for individuals who have any children enrolled full time at school expanded speci cation. 28 As noted above, individuals who were eligible for the SPA could di er from those in the control group in unobserved ways. This argument extends directly to observable differences, so the results from the expanded speci cation provide an important check on the inference. Finally, all estimation is weighted least-squares using SCF sample weights, and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity following the method of White 1980. 6. An Overview of the Data
In gure 3, I graph an estimate of the incidence of the Spouse's Allowance in the 1970's using administrative data. 29 Information on SPA bene ciaries is available for the scal year ending March 31. On the assumption that the overwhelming majority of them are female, I divide this numberby calendar year estimates of the population of females aged 60-64. The proportion of the eligible population" receiving a SPA climbs quite quickly in 1976 when the program is established, and settles in the 14 to 16 percent range by the end of the decade. In the SCF data, roughly 30 percent of women aged 60-64 are spouses of males 65 and older and thus eligible for the SPA i n this period. Therefore, by the end of the decade an upper bound estimate is that over one-half SPA eligible females are collecting the Allowance.
A view of labor supply over the period is provided in gures 4 and 5. In gure 4, I graph the proportion of females aged 60-64 who are out of the labor force in the reference week. For females eligible for the SPA this rate is fairly constant over the sample period. In contrast the rate falls sharply for females with spouses 60-64 or 50-59. The pro le for women with spouses 50-59 is somewhat erratic. This partly re ects small sample sizes: this group makes up only 7 percent of females 60-64 annual sample sizes range by year from 82 to 136. Also, the composition of the group changes dramatically over the period. For example, the proportion with only a primary education rises from 29 percent in 1971 to 51 percent in 1977. This suggests that the time trends in the raw data could re ect composition e ects, and that the conditional means from the regression analysis should bemore informative.
The SPA was introduced just prior to the survey date in 1976. Therefore, the data for 1972 and 1974 provide a limited opportunity to compare labor market trends prior to the introduction of the program. Figure 4 suggests the trends for the SPA eligible group and women with spouses aged 60-64 were very similar in this period. In fact a regression of the NLF rate on group speci c year e ects con rms there is no economically or statistically signi cant di erences in the 1972 1974 changes in rates between these two groups. 30 In contrast, the NLF rate for women with spouses 50-59 was already trending downward before the introduction of the SPA. A regression analysis indicates that the di erence here is also not statistically signi cant, but this has much to do with the imprecision of the estimates. As noted above the composition of this groups changes signi cantly over the period and this might lie behind the di erence in trends.
Using the experience of women with spouses aged 60-64 as the counterfactual, the graph suggests that the availability of the SPA is associated with a relative increase in the proportion not in the labor force. Starting in 1976, women who could collect the SPA did not share the falling NLF rates of their counterparts in the con- 30 Using the pooled sample, the regression is of the NLF rate on year dummy v ariables for 1972, 1976, 1978 and 1980 , a dummy v ariable for the women with spouses aged 60-64, and a full set of interactions of this dummy with the year e ects. trol groups.
The evidence for males is presented in gure 5. Again a comparison of labor market trends prior to the introduction of the SPA reveals a fair bit of homogeneity across groups. A regression analysis con rms this inference as all inter-group differences in the 1972 1974 changes are small and statistically insigni cant. A comparison of the post 1975 trends, suggests an impact of the SPA although it di ers somewhat across the control groups. There appears to bea common element to the 1974 1976 and 1978 1980 changes for SPA eligible males and males with spouses 50-59. One reason for some similarity in 1974 1976 change is the end of the transition period of the CPP in December1975. This end date was known well in advance 10 years so that anyone delaying retirement to this point in time might beexpected to have acted fairly quickly. In the comparisons to the other two control groups the SPA eligible males experience relative increases in NLF rates in both 1974 1976 and 1976-1978 . If the preceding reasoning is correct, then it follows that the end of the transition period had limited e ect on these other two groups. This is certainly plausible since, as shown in table 1, men in these two groups are older, and in one case have older spouses. Given limited lifespans and declining health with age, the incentives to delay retirement until the end of the transition period were greater for males in their mid to late sixties than those in their seventies. That said, it will beimportant in the regression analysis to make some control for these relative differences in the 1974-1976 changes across groups so as not to attribute them to the SPA.
These graphs suggest that the SPA m a y have had some e ect on the labor supply decisions of the a ected males and females separately. In gures 6 and 7, I present some evidence of joint labor supply. In gure 6, I graph the proportion of couples in which each memberis NLF by the di erent comparison groups for the analysis of females. There is only modest evidence here that the introduction of the SPA is correlated with an increase in this behavior. Stronger evidence is available for males. Here there is a clear, relative increase in joint absence from the labor market in couples eligible for the Allowance. Also, the SPA eligible couples and males with spouses aged 50-59 share common trends in NLF rates prior to the introduction of the SPA.
Results
In the rst panels of tables 2 and 3, I present the estimates of the parameter on SPA it Y 78 it from equation 1 from both the base and expanded speci cations. The results for males, in the rst panel of table 2 tell a fairly consistent story. Relative to each control group, men eligible for the SPA experienced a relative increase in their NLF rate and decrease in their employment rate with the introduction of the program. Regardless of speci cation or control group, the changes in the employment and NLF rates are nearly equal and opposite in sign signaling that movements in or out of unemployment are not part of picture. 31 There is also broad agreement across the three control groups, with smaller estimates obtained relative to males with the youngest wives aged 50-59. This is consistent with the evidence in gure 5. It is possible that the estimates using single men or males with older spouses also capture the e ect of the end of the CPP transition period on SPA eligible males. This e ect is more accurately netted out in the comparison to males married to females aged 50-59. Finally, the addition of demographic characteristics in the expanded speci cation has relatively little e ect on the results.
In addition to the end of the transition period, the abolition of the CPP earnings test in January 1975 could also complicate inference. Baker and Benjamin 1999 show that the abolition of the earning test is associated with increases in employ-ment rates and decreases in NLF rates. Therefore, in contrast to any e ects of the end of the transition period, the e ects of this reform should work in the opposite direction, attenuating rather than enhancing the estimated SPA e ect. Both these events would have a ected males who were eligible for the SPA and those in the various controls groups. Therefore, the net e ect of these reforms should becaptured in the estimate of the parameter on Y 78 the common year e ect assuming it is the same across these groups. The removal of the earnings test, however, only a ected males between the ages of 65 and 69. Also, as argued above, the end of the transition period might beexpected to have had larger e ects on younger males. While I do control directly for age in the expanded speci cation, there are no interactions between the age dummies and the year e ects. Therefore, to accommodate age speci c responses to the CPP reforms I add the interaction between Y 78 it and A6569 it to 1, where A6569 it = 1 if the individual is 65 to 69 years old the age range affected by the removal of the earnings test. The parameter on this variable is identied by any common change in labor supply for all males of these ages in the sample.
The results of this modi cation, reported in the second panel of table 2, are consistent with the arguments presented in the discussion of gure 5. The larger changes in the estimates of SPA it Y 78 it are for the samples using single men or men with spouses aged 65-75 as a control. The fact that there is little change in the estimates using males with spouses aged 50-59 supports the argument that the common part of the 1974 1976 changes in NLF rates of this group and SPA eligible males reects the CPP reforms that had larger e ects on younger males. The resulting estimates of SPA it Y 78 it are smaller again. The estimate of the relative increase in the NLF rate now ranges in a tight band of 6 to 7 percentage points. Also, the estimates of the A6569 it interaction display similar changes.
Corresponding results for females are presented in table 3. Note that the identi cation of the SPA e ect here is problematic. The primary strategy is compare labor supply changes across females 60-64 whose spouses are 65-75 and thus eligible for the SPA, and their counterparts of the same age whose spouses are younger 60-64, and 50-59. In contrast to the analysis in table 2, however, the couples in the control groups are not only ineligible for the SPA, but also due to their ages unaffected at least immediately by the CPP reforms. Therefore, a simple comparison of labor supply across the groups could potentially confound the e ects of all three reforms.
The base estimates for females in the rst four columns of the top panel of table 3 are largely consistent with the initial results for males using the single males and males with spouses 65-75 as control groups. The estimated relative increase in the NLF rate is 10 or 11 percentage points. In contrast to the results in table 2, however, the estimates of SPA it Y 78 it are somewhat larger once the interaction for couples in which males are 65-69 is added panel 2. Note that these males are only present in SPA eligible couples, so that in this speci cation the e ect of the SPA is identi ed by a comparison of females with spouses 70-75 and those in the control groups. Also, in this case the estimates of A6569 it Y 78 it are of opposite sign of the estimates of SPA it Y 78 it although all statistically insigni cant at conventional levels. It is likely that both the removal of the CPP earnings tests and the end of the CPP transition period had limited direct e ects on these females dues to their low employment rates.
In the third panel of the table the data for 1976 are added. The resulting estimates are smaller, and compare favourably to the results for males from this specication. The estimated relative increase in the NLF rate is 7 to 9 percentage points, while all the estimates of A6569 it Y 76 it are very close to zero. The reason for these changes in the estimates can beseen in gure 4. The NLF rates of SPA eligible females and the control groups start to deviate with the 1974 1976 changes. By discarding this part of the post-SPA relative di erences I obtain a smaller estimate.
Because isolating the e ect of the SPA on females is problematic, it is worth examining another identi cation strategy. It is possible to partly replicate the strategy used for males by exploiting variation across age groups. For example, one comparison that may beinformative is of SPA eligible females to females aged 50-59 who are also married to males aged 65-69. The age of the husbands is the same for each group, so it is more straightforward to capture any e ects of the CPP reforms possibly through the husband. Also, because the ages of the wives di er, only the couples in which the wife is 60-64 qualify for the SPA. Finally, the females in each group were not eligible for any IS bene ts prior to the introduction of the SPA. The downside to this approach is the possibility of attributing age speci c labor market shocks to the introduction of the Allowance. Also, any dynamic e ects of the intro-duction of the SPA on the younger females would bias the results. 32 The results using females 50-59 married to males 65-75 as a control group are reported in the nal two columns of table 3. The estimates of the increase in the NLF rate are smaller using this strategy, and comparable to the results for males. With the introduction of the data for 1976, however, the estimated parameter for the NLF rate is roughly the same size as its standard error.
In gure 8 I plot the NLF rates for females in this new control group. A comparison to gure 4 reveals that the identi cation of the SPA e ect is essentially the same regardless of the comparison. In 1974 1976 the NLF rates in the control groups start to fall while they remain constant for the SPA eligible females. The decrease is relatively smaller and concentrated in the 1974-1976 period for females aged 50-59 married to males aged 65-75. Therefore for females the SPA e ect is essentially that they did not share the increase in labor market activity experienced by other women their own age, and younger women married to spouses of similar age, with the introduction of the new program. Prior to this point, the four groups shared similar labor market trends.
I also graph the NLF rates of females aged 65-75 married to men 65-75. These women were not eligible for the SPA, but in this case the program would besuperuous. Due to their age, they were eligible for GIS and OAS bene ts throughout the sample period. Therefore, with the introduction of the SPA the eligible females gain access to the resources already available to this group. It is interesting, therefore, that this group also does not show any sign of the time e ect in 1974 1976 which sent the NLF rates in the other comparison groups falling. 33 In fact, the changes NLF rates for this group are very similar to those of SPA eligible females through- 32 An additional age based comparison is available: females in SPA eligible couples to 65-75 year old females who are married to 65-75 year old males. This comparison is taken up below. 33 Estimates of equation 1 using the group of females aged 65-75 married to males 65-75 as a control con rms this result. In these regressions the estimate of the SPA it Y 78 it interaction is consistently small and statistically insigni cant. out the sample period. What distinguishes these two groups from the others is the resources represented by the SPA. The inference here is that these resources are the common factor that kept" these two groups from sharing the trend towards greater participation in the labor market exhibited by the women in the other three control groups. 34 The results so far are for the aggregate e ect of the SPA o n labor market behavior. The analysis in gure 2, however, suggests that the e ects will beconcentrated among individuals with income below the break even point. 35 Therefore, a renement of the inference is possible if couples in this region of the budget constraint can beisolated within both the SPA eligible group and the various control groups. To attempt this, I draw samples of males 65-75 with spouses 50-75, and females 60-64 with spouses 50-75, from the 1971 Canadian Census, excluding couples living in Quebec, and in which one or both of the individuals are self employed. 36 For each sample, I estimate a regression of measures of the couple's combined income on dummy variables for their single year age and education, as well as province effects, using a tobit speci cation. 37 I then use the estimated equation to predict 1970 income for couples in the SCF data sets. 38 Finally, I de ne a dummy variable BE which equals 1 if predicted earnings are less than or equal to the break even level in 1975 adjusted to 1970 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. I do not want to use the actual 1970 break even level, because as can been seen in gure 1 both OAS 34 SPA eligible females and these older women also share being married to males who are eligible for all the bene ts of the Canadian IS system, but this is also true of the females aged 50-59 married to males 65-75. 35 As noted above, some individuals above the break even point m a y h a ve the incentive l o wer labor supply to receive bene ts. 36 This exclusion was imposed to address the transitory large and small i.e., negative earnings of these individuals. 37 There are couples with negative income under the di erent measures I use. They are always less than 0.7 percent of the sample, however.
38 PEI was not included in the public use sample of the 1971 census. I use the province e ect for Nova Scotia to predict income for individuals from this province in the SCFs. Note a very small number of observations are from this province generally 0.5 to 0.8 percent per year. and GIS bene ts increase substantially in real terms in the early 1970s. Note that I temporarily drop the single men as a control group at this point to focus on a more homogeneous group for the income predictions.
The tax-back of SPA bene ts circa 1975, is based on income calculated according to the income tax act, less any OAS or GIS bene ts and any bene ts payable under provincial programs for the elderly. The most detailed income variables in the 1971 census are for the census family, which may include monies attributable to individuals other than the couple, and thus not included in family income" as de ned by the program. Also, many of these variables combine taxable" and non-taxable" sources of income. At the individual level, the only income variables are employment income and total income. 39 Given these constraints, I use two measures of the couples taxable resources in the estimation. The rst is simply the sum of the employment income of each spouse Predicted Earnings". In the second, I add to this the family income from other sources" Predicted Income", which includes bond and deposit interest, dividends, other investment income, retirement pensions from previous employment and other income mortgage interest, net rents, estate income or interest or cash dividends from insurance policies. One concern is this last category, which can bepositive or negative, may contain a large transitory component. Another is that this variable will overestimate the income from other sources for the couple, due to the presence of other family members. Given that the simple sum of employment income most likely underestimates the taxable resources of the couple, these two measure may b e viewed to bracket the object of interest. 40 The dummy variable BEis added to equation 1 along with its interactions with the year e ects and the SPA it Y 78 it interaction. The resulting equation is estimated using the expanded set of control variables as well as the A6569 it Y 78 it interaction. The estimates for individuals above the break even point, as well the estimates for individuals below the break even point relative to this base response, are reported in table 4. The results using Predicted Earnings display some agreement with expectations. For example, the results for males using males 65-75 with spouses 50-59 as a control indicate the response to the SPA i s almost exclusively among those below the break even point. The estimates for those above the break even point are wrong signed and statistically insigni cant. In contrast, the results using males 65-75 with spouses 65-75 as a control suggest there is little to distinguish individuals by their predicted position on the budget constraint. Some of the results for females would appear to contradict the predictions in gure 2. Using females aged 60-64 with spouses 60-64 as the control group, it would appear that it is individuals who are above the break point who are driving the aggregate results. It is only using the control group of females aged 50-59 with spouses aged 65-75 that the interactions have the expected sign.
The results using Predicted Income are generally less supportive. All of the results for males now suggest there is little to distinguish the responses of males above or below the break even point. The results for females shift in a similar direction: the results using the control groups with females aged 60-64 are even more puzzling, and the change in the results using females aged 50-59 are similar to the changes observed for males.
In attempting to interpret these results it is useful to consider the proportion of each group predicted to beat or below the break even point in each group. These are reported in table 5. Not surprisingly, the proportions using Predicted Earnings are generally higher than those using Predicted Income. One thing to note is that the proportions for females 60-64 with spouses younger than 65 are very small by either de nition of income. It would appear that earnings are strongly correlated with the age of the husband, re ecting most likely their role as primary earners in these cohorts. As a consequence, it is not clear that these are good" control groups for this purpose. The females aged 50-59 with spouses aged 65-75 exhibit proportions below the break even point that are comparable to those of SPA eligible couples, and thus are a better match in this dimension.
Lining up the changes in the proportions by the de nition of predicted family resources in table 5, with the changes in the results in table 4, it appears that the response to the SPA is concentrated in a group that excludes very high earners. Further re nement that focuses on a more select group of individuals with modestnancial resources i.e., using Predicted Income is not meaningful, however. There is some evidence, therefore, that the e ect of the SPA is primarily within a group with more limited labor market opportunities.
While the preceding results suggest the introduction of the SPA w as correlated with decreased labor market activity of eligible males, and to a lesser extent eligible females, it does not provide any information on the joint labor market status of household members. In table 6, I present the results of re-estimating some versions of 1 substituting measures of joint labor market behavior as the dependent variable. The variables examined are joint employment and NLF rates as of the survey week. The analysis is conducted for the di erent comparison groups from tables 2 and 3 excluding single males. Note that identi cation here is somewhat di erent than in the preceding results. For example, consider the estimates for SPA eligible couples using couples where the female is 60-64 and the male is 50-59 as the control group. Any change in the behavior of SPA eligible females is identi ed the same way as in the corresponding results in table 3 i.e., relative to females of the same age. The identi cation of any change in behavior of SPA eligible males, however, does not have a counterpart in table 2. Here the comparison is across males of di erent ages males 65-75 to males 50-59 where in table 2 the age of the males is held constant. Therefore, the estimates for the joint labor market variables are not a simple mapping of the preceding inference.
The estimates in table 6 indicate that the introduction of the SPA is associated with a decrease in joint employment and increase in joint absence from the labor market, although in some cases the estimates are imprecise. Note that the estimated reductions in joint activity are generally larger using the female control groups. Perhaps the most convincing results should bethe estimates using the control group males 65-75 married to females 50-59. Here the labor market activity of SPA eligible males is measured relative to the group that the preceding argument establishes as most likely to net out the e ects of contemporaneous reforms of the CPP. Likewise, the discussion of table 5 suggests that the 50-59 year old women provide the best comparison group for SPA eligible females.
Of course the estimates in table 6 do not signal joint retirement. It is not possible to directly measure joint retirement without panel data, which do not exist for this time period. The results in table 6 may beconsistent with joint withdrawal, but needn't imply it. For example, the increase in joint absence from the labor market could arise from the retirement of men in couples where the wife does not work. In fact, this result is suggested by the absolute increase in NLF rates for SPA eligible males gure 5 and relatively constant NLF rates for SPA eligible females gures 4 or 8.
Conclusions
I examine the e ect of the introduction of the Spouse's Allowance, to Canada's Income Security system, on the retirement behavior of couples. This episode provides an opportunity to analyze couples' behavior on the basis of a policy intervention rather than relying on cross individual couple variation in bene t entitlement, which is likely correlated with other unobserved determinants of labor market deci-sions.
The Allowance provided an unambiguous incentive for individuals in eligible couples to withdraw from the labor market. I provide evidence the males and females in these couples responded to these incentives in the form of relative decreases in their employment rates and increases in their NLF rates. For males there is an absolute increase in the NLF rate, while SPA eligible females did not share the rising labor market participation rates of their counterparts in the control groups. Also, the changes in labor market activity are concentrated among individuals who have limited labor market opportunities. Finally, I provide some evidence of changes in joint labor market status with the policy reform. Decreases in joint employment and increases in joint absence from the labor market are observed among SPA eligible couples.
Data Appendix

Survey of Consumer Finances
The data are extracted from the 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980 Canadian Census, 1971 Data are extracted by the same sample de nitions used for the SCF. A couple's earnings are de ned as the sum of each spouse's total income from employment, excluding observations where either spouse is coded as self-employed using the Class of worker" variable. A couple's income is constructed by adding Total family income from other sources" to this sum. All other variables are de ned as their SCF counterparts. Notes: Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Source: 1972 Source: , 1974 Source: , 1976 Source: , 1978 Source: and 1980 Notes: Source CCH Canadian Limited (1996) . OAS: Old Age Security; GIS: Guarenteed Income Supplement; CPP: Canada Pension Plan. The GIS benefit is for a married couple. In 1970 it is calculated as two times the single GIS benefit. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Year 1980 .7
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